This research addresses the issue of common pool resources (CPR) overuse from the perspective of forest resource management in Thailand. The research focuses on two main aspects: (1) to understand the impact on extraction behavior of the stringency level of the regulation and (2) to understand the effect of regulatory approach on the decision of resource users. The research also addresses the issue of gender and the relationship between real and experimental outcomes. The main research methodology is experimental economics. Findings reveal that low and medium stringency levels work better than high stringency in bringing about cooperation in CPR setting with weak monitoring and enforcement. Incentives also matter in successful CPR management, but positive and negative incentives work differently. Rewards work better with medium-level stringency. Punishment works better with low-level level. There were also gender differences in players’ response to regulation. For the men, low-level stringency works better in reducing extraction. For the women, medium-level stringency results in the least extraction. In terms of collaboration between game outcomes and real choices, there was evidence to support that game results corroborate with decisions made by the participants in the real world.

Optimal Regulatory Design in the Context of Weak Enforcement: Do Regulatory Stringency and Regulatory Approach Matter in Determining Common Pool Resource Extraction Behavior?
Optimal Regulatory Design in the Context of Weak Enforcement: Do Regulatory Stringency and Regulatory Approach Matter in Determining Common Pool Resource Extraction Behavior?